Investigation playbook · identity
Suspicious sign-in playbook
For alerts about accounts and sign-ins: impossible travel, unfamiliar sign-in properties, MFA changes, risky users.
Answer these before you decide
- Who is the account: a normal user, an admin, a service account? Is it enabled?
- Where did the sign-in come from? Lookup the IP: corporate VPN, known office, hosting provider, documentation range?
- How was MFA satisfied: interactive approval on a compliant device, or "satisfied by token claim" from an unmanaged one?
- Is there a planned change, a known noise item in the handover, or a pattern (many users, one IP)?
- Did anything happen after the sign-in: mailbox rules, consent grants, new MFA methods, mass downloads?
When it is an incident: first containment
Revoke sessions (token theft) or disable the user (stolen password), then escalate.
A playbook says what to check. Whether this alert is real is what the logs tell you.
Events to read
- Event ID 4624: An account was successfully logged on.
- Event ID 4662: An operation was performed on an object.
- Event ID 4769: A Kerberos service ticket was requested.
- Event ID 4886: Certificate Services received a certificate request.
- Event ID 4887: Certificate Services approved a certificate request and issued a certificate.
ATT&CK techniques these alerts carry
- T1003.006 OS Credential Dumping: DCSync
- T1078 Valid Accounts
- T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
- T1098.005 Account Manipulation: Device Registration
- T1110.001 Brute Force: Password Guessing
- T1133 External Remote Services
- T1528 Steal Application Access Token
- T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie
- T1550.004 Use Alternate Authentication Material: Web Session Cookie
- T1556.006 Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication
- T1558.003 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting
- T1564.008 Hide Artifacts: Email Hiding Rules
- T1621 Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation
- T1649 Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates
Practise it
- A service desk call, a new MFA method, and then? Intermediate · Identity
- A Teams call from "the help desk", then Quick Assist Intermediate · Identity
- Impossible-travel sign-in flagged by the rule Beginner · Identity
- Phished user, token replay and internal phishing Intermediate · Identity
- Device code phishing and mailbox theft Intermediate · Identity
Alerts in the shift that use this playbook
- Bulk RC4 service-ticket requests
- Certificate requested with a domain-admin alternate name
- Device code sign-in
- Directory replication by a non-DC account
- Failed sign-in followed by success
- Impossible travel sign-in
- Many VPN login failures, then a success
- Multiple failed logins (external)
- New device MFA enrolment
- Repeated MFA requests, then an approval
- Sign-in outside working hours
- Sign-in with no MFA prompt from new ASN
- Token sign-in from a new ASN, then a new MFA method
- Token sign-in from a new device
In the glossary
- Event ID
- Logon type
- Kerberoasting
- DCSync
- Lateral movement
- MFA fatigue
- AiTM phishing
- Token theft
- Device code phishing
- Consent phishing
- Inbox rule