Identity case
Device code phishing and mailbox theft
A user signed in with a device code from a VPS provider. They say they only confirmed something for Teams, and MFA passed.
- IntermediateLevel
- 25 minAbout
- New detailsEvery attempt
- KQL or SPLQuery language
Free. Read the briefing as a guest; investigating needs a free account.
The alert
Sign-in with the device code flow from hosting infrastructure
jjohnson signed in with a device code from a VPS provider. The user says they "only confirmed something for Teams". MFA passed, so maybe fine? Escalating to be sure.
From one version of the case: the company, the people and the details change with every attempt.
About this kind of alert
Device code phishing: the user types a code on the genuine Microsoft sign-in page and, without knowing it, signs in a device someone else controls.
What you do
- Read the escalation from an L1 colleague and the events they attached.
- Hunt the logs in KQL (Microsoft Sentinel) or SPL (Splunk) and pin the evidence.
- Find the root cause and scope the incident: which accounts and hosts are affected.
- Map what you found to MITRE ATT&CK, set the severity and choose the response.
- Get a debrief: what happened, the evidence you missed, and what the attacker does next if you were wrong.
Logs you will query
| Microsoft Sentinel | Splunk |
|---|---|
SigninLogs | index=azure sourcetype=azure:monitor:aad |
EmailEvents | index=o365 sourcetype=o365:reporting:messagetrace |
AuditLogs | index=azure sourcetype=azure:monitor:aad |
WebProxy_CL | index=proxy sourcetype=cisco:cloud_security:proxy |


