Windows Security log
4624 An account was successfully logged on.
A logon session was created on the computer that logs the event. The logon type says how: at the keyboard, over the network, as a service, through Remote Desktop. It is the event every investigation of an account starts from.
- SecurityLog
- Microsoft-Windows-Security-AuditingSource
- Audit LogonAudit policy
- 16Cases and alerts that use it
Fields to read
| Field | What it tells you |
|---|---|
TargetUserName | The account that logged on. |
LogonType | 2 interactive, 3 network, 4 batch, 5 service, 7 unlock, 10 Remote Desktop, 11 cached interactive. |
IpAddress / WorkstationName | Where the logon came from (for network and Remote Desktop logons). |
AuthenticationPackageName | Kerberos or NTLM. NTLM between domain computers deserves a second look. |
ElevatedToken | Whether the session got a full administrator token. |
TargetLogonId | The session ID: links this logon to the 4672, 4688 and 4634 events of the same session. |
Normal
- Type 3 network logons all day long: file shares, printers, domain controllers.
- Types 2, 7 and 11 on a user’s own laptop during working hours.
- Type 5 service logons by service accounts when services start.
Suspicious
- Type 10 (Remote Desktop) from the internet or from a host that never connects to this one.
- A success right after a run of 4625 failures for the same account or from the same address.
- One account logging on to many hosts over the network in a short time (lateral movement).
- Administrator accounts logging on to ordinary workstations, or at hours they never work.
Find it
Microsoft Sentinel (KQL)
SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 4624Splunk (SPL)
index=wineventlog source="XmlWinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4624Table, index and source names as CyberSim uses them; your workspace may name them differently.
Where you meet it in CyberSim
Cases
- Exploit attempts on the VPN appliance: did one get in? Advanced · Network
- Phished user, token replay and internal phishing Intermediate · Identity
- Mass file modification on file server Beginner · Endpoint
- Certutil and PowerShell bypass on many machines at night Intermediate · Endpoint
- Fake PDF viewer installs a hidden scheduled task Intermediate · Endpoint
- Aggressive scanning and a blocked LSASS access Intermediate · Endpoint
- VPN account brute forced, admin access to file server Advanced · Network
- Web shell on the public web server, pivot to SQL Advanced · Network
- Exposed RDP, credential dumping and shadow copies deleted Advanced · Endpoint
Alerts in the shift
- Admin network logon, then a new service on that host
- Credential-store access (LSASS)
- Directory replication by a non-DC account
- Mass file modification on a server
- RDP logon from the internet after repeated failures
- RDP logon to server
- Remote command execution via WMI
The L3 war room
- Contractor VPN to data theft
- Edge VPN exploit to hypervisor ransomware
- Kerberoasting to DCSync
- Linux web server to cryptominer
- Macro to domain takeover
- Stolen session, OAuth app persistence and payment fraud
- Web shell to domain ransomware
It is also part of the background activity of every investigation window: the noise you search through.
ATT&CK techniques it can show
- T1021.001 Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol
- T1021.002 Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares
In the glossary
Other Security events
- 4625 An account failed to log on.
- 4634 An account was logged off.
- 4661 A handle to an object was requested.
- 4662 An operation was performed on an object.
- 4663 An attempt was made to access an object.
- 4672 Special privileges assigned to new logon.
- 4688 A new process has been created.
- 4698 A scheduled task was created.
- 4720 A user account was created.
- 4728 A member was added to a security-enabled global group.
- 4768 A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested.
- 4769 A Kerberos service ticket was requested.
- 4886 Certificate Services received a certificate request.
- 4887 Certificate Services approved a certificate request and issued a certificate.
- 5136 A directory service object was modified.
- 5145 A network share object was checked to see whether client can be granted desired access.
- 6416 A new external device was recognized by the System.
Source: Microsoft Learn: event 4624