Identity case · built on 2026 attacks
A Teams call from "the help desk", then Quick Assist
A flood of spam, then "the help desk" on Teams, then a Quick Assist session. Your own IT, or someone else’s?
- IntermediateLevel
- 25 minAbout
- 3 versionsEvery attempt
- KQL or SPLQuery language
Free. Read the briefing as a guest; investigating needs a free account.
The alert
Quick Assist session started
Jessica Johnson says "IT" called on Teams about all the spam and then ran a support session. Quick Assist ran on RID-WS-0517. I have not touched anything yet.
From one version of the case: the company, the people and the details change with every attempt.
What you do
- Read the escalation from an L1 colleague and the events they attached.
- Hunt the logs in KQL (Microsoft Sentinel) or SPL (Splunk) and pin the evidence, then prove it: answer questions with values from the logs.
- Find the root cause and scope the incident: which accounts and hosts are affected.
- Map what you found to MITRE ATT&CK, set the severity and choose the response.
- Get a debrief: what happened, the evidence you missed, and what the attacker does next if you were wrong.
Each attempt is another version: another company, other people, and sometimes another outcome. One version may be an attack, another a false alarm. You cannot learn the answer, only the method.
Logs you will query
| Microsoft Sentinel | Splunk |
|---|---|
Sysmon | index=sysmon sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog |
AuditLogs | index=azure sourcetype=azure:monitor:aad |
EmailEvents | index=o365 sourcetype=o365:reporting:messagetrace |
What it is built on
The 2026 Teams vishing campaigns: a spam flood, an external "help desk" on Teams, a Quick Assist session and PowerShell staging, which in the reported cases led to ransomware within a day. The companies, people, domains and addresses are fictional; the behaviour and the log formats follow the public reporting.
- Zscaler ThreatLabz on Teams vishing, Quick Assist and GoGRPC
- Cybersecurity Dive on the Sophos STAC4749 campaign


