Identity case · built on 2026 attacks
A service desk call, a new MFA method, and then?
The service desk reset a password, and a new Authenticator appeared minutes later. A lost phone, or someone else on the line?
- IntermediateLevel
- 25 minAbout
- 3 versionsEvery attempt
- KQL or SPLQuery language
Free, in the browser, no account needed.
The alert
Security info registered right after an admin password reset
jjohnson got a password reset from the service desk and registered a new Authenticator minutes later. Could be a lost phone, could be someone else. Escalating to be sure.
From one version of the case: the company, the people and the details change with every attempt.
What you do
- Read the escalation from an L1 colleague and the events they attached.
- Hunt the logs in KQL (Microsoft Sentinel) or SPL (Splunk) and pin the evidence, then prove it: answer questions with values from the logs.
- Find the root cause and scope the incident: which accounts and hosts are affected.
- Map what you found to MITRE ATT&CK, set the severity and choose the response.
- Get a debrief: what happened, the evidence you missed, and what the attacker does next if you were wrong.
Each attempt is another version: another company, other people, and sometimes another outcome. One version may be an attack, another a false alarm. You cannot learn the answer, only the method.
Logs you will query
| Microsoft Sentinel | Splunk |
|---|---|
SigninLogs | index=azure sourcetype=azure:monitor:aad |
AuditLogs | index=azure sourcetype=azure:monitor:aad |
EmailEvents | index=o365 sourcetype=o365:reporting:messagetrace |
What it is built on
Help desk vishing: a caller talks the service desk into a password and MFA reset, the pattern behind many 2025 and 2026 intrusions. The companies, people, domains and addresses are fictional; the behaviour and the log formats follow the public reporting.


