Network case · built on 2026 attacks
Exploit attempts on the VPN appliance: did one get in?
The IPS saw exploit attempts against the VPN appliance, but only in monitor mode. Did one get through?
- AdvancedLevel
- 35 minAbout
- 2 versionsEvery attempt
- KQL or SPLQuery language
Free. Read the briefing as a guest; investigating needs a free account.
The alert
FortiGate IPS: SSL-VPN pre-auth exploit signature (monitor mode)
IPS fired on exploit attempts against the VPN appliance from 198.51.100.62. IPS is in monitor mode so it did not block. Did it get through?
From one version of the case: the company, the people and the details change with every attempt.
What you do
- Read the escalation from an L1 colleague and the events they attached.
- Hunt the logs in KQL (Microsoft Sentinel) or SPL (Splunk) and pin the evidence, then prove it: answer questions with values from the logs.
- Find the root cause and scope the incident: which accounts and hosts are affected.
- Map what you found to MITRE ATT&CK, set the severity and choose the response.
- Get a debrief: what happened, the evidence you missed, and what the attacker does next if you were wrong.
Each attempt is another version: another company, other people, and sometimes another outcome. One version may be an attack, another a false alarm. You cannot learn the answer, only the method.
Logs you will query
| Microsoft Sentinel | Splunk |
|---|---|
CommonSecurityLog | index=firewall sourcetype=fgt_traffic |
Syslog | index=linux sourcetype=linux_secure |
SecurityEvent | index=wineventlog sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog |
What it is built on
Exploited edge devices (exploits were the top initial infection vector in Mandiant’s 2025 investigations), in FortiGate’s own log format. The companies, people, domains and addresses are fictional; the behaviour and the log formats follow the public reporting.


