Endpoint case
Exposed RDP, credential dumping and shadow copies deleted
Shadow copies were deleted on an application server. L1 escalated it without checking anything else. How close is this to ransomware?
- AdvancedLevel
- 35 minAbout
- New detailsEvery attempt
- KQL or SPLQuery language
Free. Read the briefing as a guest; investigating needs a free account.
The alert
Shadow copies deleted
vssadmin delete shadows on RID-APP-03. That's bad right? Escalating, didn't check anything else
From one version of the case: the company, the people and the details change with every attempt.
About this kind of alert
Ransomware precursors: deleted shadow copies are one of the last steps before encryption, and the trail before them shows how close it is.
What you do
- Read the escalation from an L1 colleague and the events they attached.
- Hunt the logs in KQL (Microsoft Sentinel) or SPL (Splunk) and pin the evidence.
- Find the root cause and scope the incident: which accounts and hosts are affected.
- Map what you found to MITRE ATT&CK, set the severity and choose the response.
- Get a debrief: what happened, the evidence you missed, and what the attacker does next if you were wrong.
Logs you will query
| Microsoft Sentinel | Splunk |
|---|---|
SecurityEvent | index=wineventlog sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog |
Sysmon | index=sysmon sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog |


