Endpoint case · built on 2026 attacks
The Adobe update that came with remote access
ScreenConnect installed as a service on a Finance laptop, validly signed. IT’s support tool, or someone else’s?
- IntermediateLevel
- 25 minAbout
- 2 versionsEvery attempt
- KQL or SPLQuery language
Free, in the browser, no account needed.
The alert
Remote access software installed as a service
ScreenConnect got installed as a service on RID-WS-0517. EDR says it is signed by ConnectWise, so maybe IT? Escalating to check.
From one version of the case: the company, the people and the details change with every attempt.
What you do
- Read the escalation from an L1 colleague and the events they attached.
- Hunt the logs in KQL (Microsoft Sentinel) or SPL (Splunk) and pin the evidence, then prove it: answer questions with values from the logs.
- Find the root cause and scope the incident: which accounts and hosts are affected.
- Map what you found to MITRE ATT&CK, set the severity and choose the response.
- Get a debrief: what happened, the evidence you missed, and what the attacker does next if you were wrong.
Each attempt is another version: another company, other people, and sometimes another outcome. One version may be an attack, another a false alarm. You cannot learn the answer, only the method.
Logs you will query
| Microsoft Sentinel | Splunk |
|---|---|
EmailEvents | index=o365 sourcetype=o365:reporting:messagetrace |
Sysmon | index=sysmon sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog |
WebProxy_CL | index=proxy sourcetype=cisco:cloud_security:proxy |
Event | index=wineventlog sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog |
What it is built on
Phishing that installs ScreenConnect and other remote-management tools disguised as software updates. The companies, people, domains and addresses are fictional; the behaviour and the log formats follow the public reporting.


