Cloud case · built on 2026 attacks
npm install, and then the cloud keys moved
npm install ran a script that started processes and went online. A native build, or one of this year’s npm worms?
- AdvancedLevel
- 35 minAbout
- 2 versionsEvery attempt
- KQL or SPLQuery language
Free. Read the briefing as a guest; investigating needs a free account.
The alert
Package install script spawned processes and network connections
npm install on RID-WS-0517 ran an install script that started child processes and went online. The dev says it is a normal dependency bump, but with all the npm worms this year I did not want to close it.
From one version of the case: the company, the people and the details change with every attempt.
What you do
- Read the escalation from an L1 colleague and the events they attached.
- Hunt the logs in KQL (Microsoft Sentinel) or SPL (Splunk) and pin the evidence, then prove it: answer questions with values from the logs.
- Find the root cause and scope the incident: which accounts and hosts are affected.
- Map what you found to MITRE ATT&CK, set the severity and choose the response.
- Get a debrief: what happened, the evidence you missed, and what the attacker does next if you were wrong.
Each attempt is another version: another company, other people, and sometimes another outcome. One version may be an attack, another a false alarm. You cannot learn the answer, only the method.
Logs you will query
| Microsoft Sentinel | Splunk |
|---|---|
AuditLogs | index=azure sourcetype=azure:monitor:aad |
Sysmon | index=sysmon sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog |
WebProxy_CL | index=proxy sourcetype=cisco:cloud_security:proxy |
What it is built on
The 2026 npm worms that steal developer tokens on install and spread with them. The companies, people, domains and addresses are fictional; the behaviour and the log formats follow the public reporting.

