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Illustration for the case: A new workflow ran once, and the deploy key moved

Cloud case · built on 2026 attacks

A new workflow ran once, and the deploy key moved

A workflow change ran on main, and the deploy key was used right after. A routine update, or GhostAction?

Open this case

Free. Read the briefing as a guest; investigating needs a free account.

The alert

New or changed GitHub Actions workflow ran on the default branch

A workflow change on ridgeway/billing-api ran on main and the deploy key was used right after. After GhostAction I am not closing workflow changes I cannot explain.

From one version of the case: the company, the people and the details change with every attempt.

What you do

  1. Read the escalation from an L1 colleague and the events they attached.
  2. Hunt the logs in KQL (Microsoft Sentinel) or SPL (Splunk) and pin the evidence, then prove it: answer questions with values from the logs.
  3. Find the root cause and scope the incident: which accounts and hosts are affected.
  4. Map what you found to MITRE ATT&CK, set the severity and choose the response.
  5. Get a debrief: what happened, the evidence you missed, and what the attacker does next if you were wrong.

Each attempt is another version: another company, other people, and sometimes another outcome. One version may be an attack, another a false alarm. You cannot learn the answer, only the method.

Logs you will query

Microsoft SentinelSplunk
AuditLogsindex=azure sourcetype=azure:monitor:aad

What it is built on

GhostAction and the 2026 GitHub Actions compromises: a stolen maintainer token pushes a workflow that posts the repository secrets out, and the cloud key is used from outside. The companies, people, domains and addresses are fictional; the behaviour and the log formats follow the public reporting.

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