Cloud case · built on 2026 attacks
A new workflow ran once, and the deploy key moved
A workflow change ran on main, and the deploy key was used right after. A routine update, or GhostAction?
- AdvancedLevel
- 35 minAbout
- 2 versionsEvery attempt
- KQL or SPLQuery language
Free. Read the briefing as a guest; investigating needs a free account.
The alert
New or changed GitHub Actions workflow ran on the default branch
A workflow change on ridgeway/billing-api ran on main and the deploy key was used right after. After GhostAction I am not closing workflow changes I cannot explain.
From one version of the case: the company, the people and the details change with every attempt.
What you do
- Read the escalation from an L1 colleague and the events they attached.
- Hunt the logs in KQL (Microsoft Sentinel) or SPL (Splunk) and pin the evidence, then prove it: answer questions with values from the logs.
- Find the root cause and scope the incident: which accounts and hosts are affected.
- Map what you found to MITRE ATT&CK, set the severity and choose the response.
- Get a debrief: what happened, the evidence you missed, and what the attacker does next if you were wrong.
Each attempt is another version: another company, other people, and sometimes another outcome. One version may be an attack, another a false alarm. You cannot learn the answer, only the method.
Logs you will query
| Microsoft Sentinel | Splunk |
|---|---|
AuditLogs | index=azure sourcetype=azure:monitor:aad |
What it is built on
GhostAction and the 2026 GitHub Actions compromises: a stolen maintainer token pushes a workflow that posts the repository secrets out, and the cloud key is used from outside. The companies, people, domains and addresses are fictional; the behaviour and the log formats follow the public reporting.
- GitGuardian on the GhostAction campaign
- The Hacker News on credential-stealing workflows, October 2026

