Theory · 9 min · Email and phishing analysis
SPF, DKIM and DMARC
Read a DMARC verdict and know what a pass does and does not prove.
SPF lets a domain publish which servers may send mail for it. The receiver checks the connecting server against the domain in the envelope sender (MAIL FROM), not the From header.
DKIM adds a cryptographic signature over parts of the message, made with a key the signing domain publishes in DNS. A valid signature shows the signing domain sent it and the signed parts were not changed.
DMARC ties them to what the user sees: it passes when SPF or DKIM passes for a domain that aligns with the From header domain. Its policy (none, quarantine, reject) tells receivers what to do on failure. DMARC is now RFC 9989 (May 2026, replacing RFC 7489): the verdicts and policies are the same, but receivers find the organisational domain by walking the DNS tree instead of using the Public Suffix List.
A pass is not "safe". An attacker who registers northwind-flnance.example can pass SPF, DKIM and DMARC for their own look-alike domain. Authentication proves who sent it, not that they are honest.
Your turn: decide on a scenario. Authentication-Results for a message: what does it tell you?
Do the interactive check Free, in the browser.
Sources
- RFC 7208: Sender Policy Framework (SPF) IETF
- RFC 6376: DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Signatures IETF
- RFC 9989: Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC, May 2026) IETF
- RFC 8601: Message Header Field for Indicating Message Authentication Status IETF