Theory · 8 min · Identity and sign-in logs
Stolen sessions and how to end them
Respond to a token theft in a way that actually locks the attacker out.
After sign-in, access runs on tokens and cookies. A stolen session cookie (T1539) replayed from elsewhere (T1550.004) does not need the password or MFA.
A password reset alone does not end existing sessions. In Entra ID you revoke the user’s refresh tokens and sessions (for example Revoke-MgUserSignInSession), which forces new sign-ins. Access tokens already issued stay valid until they expire (60 to 90 minutes by default) unless the app supports continuous access evaluation, so check activity after the revoke too.
An AiTM page captures the password as well as the session, and attackers often register their own MFA method within minutes. Revoking, resetting and removing that method each close a different door, so they belong in one containment step: revoke sessions while the attacker still knows the password and owns an MFA method, and they simply sign in again. If they must be sequential, remove the attacker’s method and reset the password first, then revoke.
Then remove what else the attacker added: inbox rules, app consents, forwarding. Then search for the same IP and user agent across all users, and check what they did with the access.
Your turn: decide on a scenario. An AiTM session theft is confirmed for one user, and the attacker registered their own Authenticator. Which first move actually locks them out?
Do the interactive check Free, in the browser.
Sources
- Revoke user access in an emergency in Microsoft Entra ID Microsoft Learn
- From cookie theft to BEC: attackers use AiTM phishing sites (July 2022) Microsoft Threat Intelligence
- ATT&CK T1539: Steal Web Session Cookie MITRE ATT&CK v20