Insider case · built on 2026 attacks
The new developer who is never on camera
A developer hired three weeks ago signs in through a consumer VPN on the company laptop. Policy says our own VPN only. Is that all?
- IntermediateLevel
- 25 minAbout
- 2 versionsEvery attempt
- KQL or SPLQuery language
Free. Read the briefing as a guest; investigating needs a free account.
The alert
Sign-in through a commercial VPN service on a managed laptop
jjohnson started three weeks ago and now signs in to DevOps through a consumer VPN on the company laptop. Policy says our own VPN only. Probably nothing, but HR has been asking about remote hires since the news about fake IT workers.
From one version of the case: the company, the people and the details change with every attempt.
What you do
- Read the escalation from an L1 colleague and the events they attached.
- Hunt the logs in KQL (Microsoft Sentinel) or SPL (Splunk) and pin the evidence, then prove it: answer questions with values from the logs.
- Find the root cause and scope the incident: which accounts and hosts are affected.
- Map what you found to MITRE ATT&CK, set the severity and choose the response.
- Get a debrief: what happened, the evidence you missed, and what the attacker does next if you were wrong.
Each attempt is another version: another company, other people, and sometimes another outcome. One version may be an attack, another a false alarm. You cannot learn the answer, only the method.
Logs you will query
| Microsoft Sentinel | Splunk |
|---|---|
SigninLogs | index=azure sourcetype=azure:monitor:aad |
SecurityEvent | index=wineventlog sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog |
WebProxy_CL | index=proxy sourcetype=cisco:cloud_security:proxy |
What it is built on
Fake remote IT workers in laptop farms: a PiKVM on the company laptop, a capture card as a webcam, sign-ins through a VPN service. The companies, people, domains and addresses are fictional; the behaviour and the log formats follow the public reporting.
